JUSTICE FOR NON-HUMAN ANIMALS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36598/dhrd.v8.2819Abstract
This article is intended to highlight that a theory of justice must consider the distribution of environmental goods to all living beings. If justice criteria are based on scarcity and the distribution of goods, why not include environmental goods that are increasingly scarce? For this purpose, the research will draw on the work of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, which does not explicitly insert environmental goods. The notion of justice as equality is the starting point for debating the environmental issue. The discussion of John Rawls' justice is based on other authors, Martha Nussbaum. For the author, John Rawls' theory of justice is the best existing liberal theory, but it does have some gaps that need to be filled in to embrace individuals outside the pact, such as animals. The research is anchored in the bibliographic research of exploratory and interpretative nature and in the deductive method. The hypothesis is that environmental goods and non-human animals should be considered in a so-called theory of justice, but their inclusion in John Rawls' Theory of Justice would de-characterize it.
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